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Abstract—Concerns for utility computer networks’ security 
and reliability are growing rapidly due to increasing utility 
devices with connections to external networks. This aggravates 
vulnerability of utility networks to cyber-attacks through 
external connections. Though encryption can provide security for 
user data transmissions, encryption itself could not provide 
protections against traffic-analysis attacks. Techniques against 
traffic-analysis attacks through statistically controlling the 
transmission rate of padded and encrypted frames are unsuited 
for power system applications. This paper proposes three security 
operation modes for the newly developed security layer, located 
below DNP3 data-link layer, to strengthen encryption and 
authentication operations against the effectiveness of traffic-
analysis and cryptanalysis attacks. The security modes use 
padding to disguise the amount of user data transmitted and 
disguise the user data-link layer frame amongst a group of 
manufactured frames similar to statistically controlling data 
transmission rate. The proposed security operations have been 
successfully applied to enhance power system security controls. 
 
Index Terms--Computer networks, Computer network 
management, Computer network security, Power system 
communication, Power system security, Protocols, Security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
YBER-security becomes a growing concern for power 
system utilities with increasing power system computer 
network interconnections, power system automation, and 
open access requirements under government deregulation 
policies [1]-[3]. Typical utility network protocols such as 
DNP3 [4] were originally designed for networks that were 
only accessible by limited number of trained utility staff. As a 
consequence, DNP3 and other utility network protocols did 
not implement security such as encryption and authentication, 
now causing them to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks in the 
more open networking environment that has been aggravated 
with open access utility power systems. 
A.  Cyber-Security for Utilites 
With implementation of encryption and authentication 
security, with only authentication currently proposed for the 
DNP3 specification [5], utility communication is still 
vulnerable to attack due to the predictability of data 
transmission timing and sizes. Traffic-analysis attacks based 
on encrypted data transmission headers, frame sizes, and 
                                                          
T. Mander and F. Nabhani are with University of Teesside, U.K. 
L. Wang, H. Cheung and R. Cheung are with Ryerson University, Canada. 
timing can be used to accurately determine the data 
transmission type, i.e. unsolicited protection data 
transmissions are unlikely to occur at a normal solicited data 
transmission time and control data will use less frames than 
monitoring data. Based upon the traffic analysis attacks, 
cyber-attackers may be able to determine weaknesses to 
exploit within the power system, such as locating equipment 
to damage that will have a larger effect on power system 
operations than what would normally occur or implementing a 
denial-of-service attack on a networked device so that it 
cannot respond appropriately to protection events, i.e. unable 
to transmit a control command to a device to close circuit 
breakers. In addition, cryptanalysis attacks can be combined 
with traffic analysis attacks to break the encryption on the 
data transmissions, allowing a cyber-attacker to manipulate 
data and devices directly, i.e. influencing the behavior of 
operations by altering or creating data and controlling the 
operations of a device by activating relays. Therefore failure 
to provide adequate security for power system data 
transmissions may have severe consequences for power 
system operations.   
B.  Proposed Security Operation Modes 
  A new cyber-security pseudo-layer is proposed to enhance 
encryption security by providing increased effectiveness 
against traffic analysis and cryptanalysis attacks than simply 
using encryption security only. The proposed security layer is 
located below the DNP3 data-link layer. The security layer 
comprises three security operation modes that are derived 
from methods used to statistically control the transmission 
rate of frames. The three security operation modes are: 
padding, frame transmission group (FTG), and split-frame 
transmission group (SFTG). The security operation modes 
provide enhanced encryption confidentiality capabilities and 
limited traffic analysis prevention capabilities.  
   The security operation modes enhance typical methods used 
to counteract the traffic analysis attack potential, which can 
use padding to disguise the size of the user data and 
statistically control the transmission rate of frames [6]-[7]. 
These methods ensure that all data transmissions are all the 
same size and that data transmissions occur at a specific 
interval, where data transmissions will be created if no user 
data is available for transmission. With these methods, 
combined with encryption security for the entire frame 
including the entire frame header, traffic appears to be 
entirely uniform to an attacker. A cyber-attacker is unable to 
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determine the nature of the data being transmitted, such as 
differentiating between control and protection oriented data 
transmissions. 
For power system utilities padding can be effectively 
implemented, such as with the padding mode in this paper, but 
statistically controlling the transmission rate of frames is not 
as practicable resulting in the FTG and SFTG security modes 
proposed in this paper. There are two main reasons for 
difficulties in applying the statistical transmission rate.  
The first reason is due to the specific transmission rate for 
solicited data transmissions, i.e. control and monitoring data, 
which are highly consistent and predictable in their timing. 
Therefore, cyber-attacks would be able to use traffic analysis 
accurately to discard most of the frames created by the 
statistical transmission rate to fill in the data transmission 
gaps when no user data was being transmitted. As a 
consequence, DNP3 devices would have to process and 
transmit more data without discernable increased security. 
The second reason is due to protection oriented data 
transmissions. The protection oriented data transmission 
timing is unpredictable and cannot be delayed since they are 
time-critical to ensure reliable power system operations. Since 
the protection data transmissions are time-critical, DNP3 
devices using the statistical transmission rate for frames 
would have to increase the transmission rate to produce a 
uniform traffic pattern that will not delay protection data 
transmissions. However, this would cause a DNP3 device to 
expend greater resources inefficiently to create frames 
between the typical data transmission rate, for solicited 
control and monitoring data, which are unlikely to contain any 
protection data. For example, if the allowed transmission 
delay for protection data was 4 milliseconds and the normal 
interval between transmission times was 2 seconds, the DNP3 
outstation device would typically have to produce 500 
unnecessary frames between user data transmissions within 
the 2 second interval. Time-critical protection data 
transmission therefore limits the applicability of statistically 
controlling the transmission rate used in power system 
computer networks.  
   The FTG security mode and the SFTG security mode are 
designed in this paper to counteract these drawbacks for 
implementation of statistically controlling the transmission 
rate of frames for power system computer networks. The FTG 
security mode incorporates the padding mode and places the 
user data-link frame within a group of manufactured frames, 
forcing a cyber-attacker to spend resources on determining 
which frame contains the user data. The SFTG security mode 
incorporates the FTG mode, but splits the user data-link frame 
into a group of manufactured data-link layer frames, forcing 
the attacker to spend resources on reassembling the user data-
link layer frame before they can attack it. 
   The performances of the three security modes are 
analyzed and the results show that the padding mode is suited 
for lower security demands; the FTG security mode provides 
much higher security than the padding mode, but with 
increased processing overhead; the SFTG security mode 
provided much higher security than the FTG mode, but with 
higher processing demand. The FTG and SFTG modes are 
recommended for links requiring high security or for links that 
temporarily require higher security during cyber-attacks.  
C.  Application for Enhancement of Power System Controls 
The power distribution system operations can be 
significantly enhanced with the use of modern real-time 
computer communication and networking technology and 
state-of-the-art digital signal processing technology.  The 
security operations proposed in this paper have been 
successfully applied for enhancement of laboratory prototype 
power distribution system stability control. An illustration is 
given in this paper. 
II.  SECURITY OPERATION MODES 
A.  Padding Mode 
   The padding security operation mode is used to pad all 
DNP3 data-link layer frames to the same size, which is the 
maximum 292-octet data-link frame size. Encryption and 
authentication is applied to the data-link layer frame by the 
security layer after the padding has been added into the frame. 
The security-layer padding mode is used when a normal level 
of security is required for the power system computer network 
since it does not introduce any significant overhead for the 
security operations or bandwidth. This mode would therefore 
be typically used in substation LANs, for low risk links such 
as connecting devices into the substation, or for minimal risk 
links such as links that have never been attacked. 
   The padding of each individual data-link frame provides 
security for that particular data-link frame but not for the 
application message fragment. This limits the usefulness of 
the padding operations since a cyber-attacker could count the 
number of data-link frames used to convey the application 
message fragment to determine if control, monitoring, or 
protection data is being transmitted. However, the padding 
does help obfuscate the differences between data-link layer 
only messages that are 10 octets [8], application layer 
messages using function codes for which the application 
header and possibly only the object header is required [9], or 
for other application messages that are less than the maximum 
allowed 249 octets for transport layer fragmentation [10].  
   For application layer messages divided into several data-link 
layer frames, the padding hides the size of the last data-link 
layer frame in the sequence. Disguising the size of the last 
fragment may provide security against cyber-attacks if 
specific types of data always have the same number of octets 
in the last data-link layer frame used for the application layer 
fragment. 
   The padding is placed randomly within the data-link layer 
frame in order to obscure the data boundaries in the frame, i.e. 
the cyber-attacker is unable to assume that the twelfth octet in 
the frame would be the application header. The padding mode 
operation is shown in Fig.1 before encryption and 
authentication. 
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Maximum DNP3 Data-Link Frame Size (292 octets)
Data-Link Frame
PaddingData-Link Frame Data-Link Frame
 
Fig.1. DNP3 data-link frame padded to maximum 292 octets. 
   In Fig. 1, padding octets are generated for the DNP3 data-
link layer frame so that it is the maximum allowed 292 octets. 
The padding is then randomly placed into data-link layer 
frame at any point. 
B.  Frame Transmission Group Mode 
   The frame transmission group (FTG) security mode is used 
to disguise an encrypted data-link layer frame amongst a 
group of encrypted manufactured frames. The FTG security 
mode includes the padding mode operation so that all of the 
frames in the transmission group are the same size.  
   In the FTG mode, the data-link layer frame containing the 
user data is placed randomly within the group of 
manufactured frames, resembling statistical control of the 
data transmission timing. Therefore, there are a limited 
number of frames being transmitted at the expected 
transmission time, but with the real frame randomly placed 
within those frames. A cyber-attacker is therefore unable to 
precisely determine which data-link layer frame contains the 
user data and therefore must spend resources on examining 
each of the frames within the transmission group to determine 
the location of the user data. The FTG security mode is shown 
in Fig. 2. 
Encrypted Data-Link Frame
Data-Link Frame
PaddingData-Link Frame Data-Link Frame
Encrypted Manufactured Frame
Encrypted Manufactured Frame
Encrypted Data-Link Frame
 
Fig. 2.  FTG security mode operations are shown randomly placing the user 
data within the frame transmission group. 
   In Fig. 2, the user data-link layer frame is padded and then 
encrypted and possibly authenticated. The encrypted user 
data-link layer frame is then randomly placed amongst the 
encrypted manufactured frames in the transmission group. 
   The FTG security mode has the same limitation as the 
padding mode in which a cyber-attacker could count the 
number of data-link frames used to convey the application 
message fragment to determine if control, monitoring, or 
protection data is being transmitted.  
   The FTG mode provides more security than the padding 
mode, and is therefore used for links that are more vulnerable 
to attack such as those connecting to smart meters or for links 
between important DNP3 devices such as between 
substations. However, since the FTG security mode 
manufactures multiple frames to disguise the user data, this 
mode requires more processing and bandwidth capability 
which limits its applicability to low bandwidth devices. 
C.  Split Frame Transmission Group Mode 
   The split frame transmission group (SFTG) security 
operation mode is used to disguise a data-link layer frame 
amongst a group of manufactured frames. The SFTG security 
mode is derived from the FTG security mode. However with 
the SFTG security mode, the encrypted and authenticated user 
data-link frame is divided into several manufactured frames 
that are then encrypted rather than disguising the actual frame 
amongst a group of manufactured frames.  
   In the SFTG mode, the data-link layer frame containing the 
user data is encrypted without padding. The encrypted data-
link layer frame is then divided into a number of segments, 
with the number of segments being equal to the size of the 
transmission group. Each segment is random in size and each 
segment is placed randomly within an assigned manufactured 
frame. In essence, the operations for the segments are similar 
to the padding mode operations. All of the manufactured 
frames are then padded to the same size as was performed in 
the other two security modes before being encrypted. The 
SFTG security mode is shown in Fig. 3. 
Segment A
Data-Link Frame
Encrypted Data-Link Frame
Segment B Segment C
Segment A
Segment B
Segment C
Encrypted Manufactured Frame
Encrypted Manufactured Frame
Encrypted Manufactured Frame
 
Fig. 3.  SFTG security mode operations are shown randomly placing the user 
data within the frames of the transmission group. 
   The SFTG security mode transmits a limited number of 
frames at the expected transmission time for a cyber-attacker, 
but with the user data-link layer frame randomly placed into 
those frames. The cyber-attacker must therefore manipulate 
all of the frames in the transmission group and reassemble the 
user data-link layer frame before being capable of obtaining 
the user data. 
   The SFTG security mode has the same limitation as the 
FTG security mode in which a cyber-attacker could count the 
number of data-link frames used to convey the application 
message fragment to determine if control, monitoring, or 
protection is being transmitted.  
   The SFTG mode provides more security than the FTG mode 
since a cyber-attacker has to manipulate more data, and is 
therefore used for links that are undergoing attack or links that 
are critical to power system operations and can therefore be 
expected to be attacked. However, since the SFTG security 
mode manufactures multiple frames to disguise the user data 
and uses more encryption operations, this mode requires more 
processing and bandwidth capability which limits its 
applicability to low bandwidth devices. 
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D.  Security Header 
   The security modes require that a security header be 
appended onto the data-link layer frame so that the receiving 
DNP3 device could determine which security operations are 
to be performed on the data-link layer frame. The security 
layer header is shown in Fig. 4. 
Type Sequence
Number
Sequence
Length
Pad
Start
Pad
Stop
Mode CRC
 
Fig. 4. Security header appended onto the DNP3 data-link layer frame before 
encryption and authentication. 
   In Fig. 4, there are six fields in the security header, which 
are: mode, type, sequence number, sequence length, pad start, 
pad stop, and CRC.  
Mode: indicates the security mode used for the data 
transmission. With this indication within the frame, source 
and destination devices can independently and immediately 
transition to another mode without informing the other device 
prior to the transition. This increases the security layer 
responsiveness to changes in the security requirements.   
Type: indicates if the frame contains user data or if the frame 
is manufactured.  
Sequence Number: provides the frame sequence for the SFTG 
mode so that the frame containing the user data can be 
properly reassembled from the manufactured frames. This 
field has no relevance to the other modes. 
Sequence Length: indicates the number of frames in the SFTG 
transmission group. This field provides the flexibility for a 
security layer to alter the number of frames used in SFTG 
transmission group without previously negotiating this value. 
This increases the security layer responsiveness to changes in 
security requirements. 
Pad Start: For the padding and FTG security modes this field 
provides the starting octet location of the padding within the 
frame. For the SFTG mode, this field indicates where the 
encrypted user data-link layer frame segment begins within 
the manufactured frame.  
 
Pad Stop: For the padding and FTG security mode this field 
provides the ending octet location of the padding within the 
frame. For the SFTG mode, this field indicates where the 
encrypted user data-link layer frame segment ends within the 
manufactured frame. 
CRC: provides a cyclic redundancy check for the security 
header. 
E.  Interoperability and Security Mode Transitions 
   A difficulty in adopting any changes to a standard such as 
DNP3 is interoperability between devices that have not 
adopted the security, as well as devices using different 
security modes. The interoperability between devices using 
security and those not using security is required since 
immediate adoption of the security would be difficult and 
expensive to perform. Interoperability between devices using 
different security modes is necessary to allow devices using 
lower security capabilities to communicate with devices using 
higher security capabilities. The security layer interoperability 
issues are handled through the security layer operations and 
the security header appended onto the DNP3 data-link layer 
frame before encryption.  
   For the interoperability between DNP3 devices using the 
security and devices that do not, the frame size indicates if 
security has been used on the data-link layer frame. All the 
security modes pad the data-link layer frame to the maximum 
allowed 292 octets. The security header is then added onto the 
frame. Therefore, if the frame is larger than 292 octets, 
security has been used otherwise the security layer modes 
were not used for the data-link layer frame. 
   Previously discussed for the security header were the mode 
and sequence length fields. These two fields allow the security 
layer to transition between security modes independently in 
regards to any other DNP3 device. For the padding and FTG 
security modes each received frame is independent of the 
frames previously received or which will be received. These 
modes are only concerned if the frame is manufactured or not. 
Manufactured frames are discarded immediately by these 
modes while the user data-link layer frame is sent to the 
DNP3 protocol stack for processing. For the SFTG security 
mode, the current size of the frame transmission group is the 
only concern for reassembling the user data-link layer frame. 
The size or types of previously received or that will be 
transmission groups do not affect the SFTG operations. 
   The security layer is designed to operate on a link basis 
rather than for all of the links connected to the device. 
Therefore security is independent for each link, allowing the 
security layer to implement a different security mode for each 
link. Changes to the security mode are initiated by a master. 
An outstation implements the changes upon reading the mode 
and frame transmission group size from the security header 
received from the master. 
   The flexibility in transitioning between security modes 
provides the means for a device to operate in a nominal mode 
and then transition to a higher security mode when necessary.  
Therefore, DNP devices with low processing or bandwidth 
capability can still elicit the FTG and SFTG security modes on 
a temporary basis when necessary, increasing security while 
decreasing the device polling by a master to obtain the 
necessary bandwidth to handle the security mode operations 
(either the number of polls or the type of data being polled).   
III.  SECURITY LAYER ANALYSIS 
   The security layer is designed to provide additional strength 
to encryption and authentication operations in limiting the 
effectiveness and applicability of traffic analysis and 
cryptanalysis attacks. The security layer increases the amount 
of data that a cyber-attacker must manipulate as well as the 
amount of time for them to obtain the user data. The security 
layer is not designed to protect against attacks such as replay 
attacks. However, the DNP3 protocol stack provides 
protection from replay attacks due to the use of two sets of 
sequence numbers, the fragmentation sequence numbers used 
by the transport layer and the message fragment sequences of 
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the application layer [9]-[10]. The transport layer sequence 
number space is larger than the application layer sequence 
number space [9]-[10]. Therefore, a replayed frame is 
unlikely to have sequence numbers that match both the 
expected transport layer and application layer sequence 
numbers, causing these frames to be discarded. 
A.  Padding 
   The padding security mode adds very little processing 
overhead to the security operations and therefore provides 
nearly the same performance as simply encrypting and 
authenticating the data. The padding operations provide 
essential security to limit the capability of traffic analysis 
attacks based on the frame size. However, as mentioned this 
security can only be provided for each individual data-link 
layer frame that is transmitted since the security does not alter 
the DNP3 specification. Therefore, a cyber-attacker can still 
count the number of frames in the data transmission to 
determine the nature of the data transmission, whether it is 
control, monitoring, or protection data. This weakness could 
be remedied if the application layer padded all message 
fragments to the same size, however, this would require a 
DNP3 specification change which would violate the 
constraints created for the security layer. 
   Since the padding operations are nearly equivalent in 
performance and security as to simply using encryption on 
data transmissions, it is used as the basis for comparison with 
the other security modes. The time in which to break the 
encryption for a security layer frame using the padding 
operation is given in (1) as a general equation for any cipher 
and cipher mode for a brute force attack. Cryptanalysis is 
assumed to shorten this time by a scalar factor dependent on 
the cipher, key length and technology currently available for 
cryptanalysis attacks. However, the relative amount of time to 
break the encryption is the same for all of the modes, 
eliminating the need to discuss complicated factors that affect 
the strength of the cipher such as those pertaining to 
cryptanalysis.  
ETT =             (1) 
   where T is the total time to break the frame encryption, and 
ET is the time to break the security layer frame encryption for 
the padding mode dependent on factors such as cipher, cipher 
mode, key size, and currently available cryptanalysis attack 
techniques. 
B.  Frame Transmission Group 
   The FTG security mode increases the overall processing for 
the security layer where the security layer generates (N-1) 
frames, where N is the size of the data transmission group. 
However, the processing requirements for the destination 
device are much lower since the security layer can discard the 
manufactured frames based on the security header.  
   For the FTG security mode, the security layer also requires 
a bandwidth increase by a factor of N to provide the same 
performance as a device that did not use the security layer due 
to the additional manufactured frames. The bandwidth may 
not be an issue for LANs or for networks using fiber-optics as 
the transmission medium since the DNP3 frames are much 
smaller than the available bandwidth.  
   The strength of the FTG security mode in comparison to the 
padding mode can be classified into three scenarios: best-
case, worst-case, and average-case. The best-case scenario is 
given in (2) and represents the cyber-attacker having to attack 
all the frames in the transmission group before locating the 
frame containing the user data as determined from the type 
field in the security header. For the best-case scenario the 
security for the data transmission is equivalent to the number 
of frame used in the transmission group. 
ETNT ×=              (2) 
where T is the total time to break the frame encryption, N is 
the number of frames in the transmission group, and ET is the 
time to break the security layer frame encryption dependent 
on factors such as cipher, cipher mode, key size, and currently 
available cryptanalysis attack techniques. 
   The worst-case scenario is given in (3) and represents the 
cyber-attacker locating the user data on the first attempt, 
where a cyber-attacker can determine a successful attack from 
the type field in the security header. The worst-case scenario 
of (3) is the same as the padding security mode given by (1). 
ETT =             (3) 
where T is the total time to break the frame encryption, and 
ET is the time to break the security layer frame encryption 
dependent on factors such as cipher, cipher mode, key size, 
and currently available cryptanalysis attack techniques. 
   The average-case scenario is given in (4) and represents the 
average number attempts for an attacker to locate and obtain 
the user data. 
ETNET
N
i
ETAT
N
i ×≈×=×=
∑
=
2
1
       (4) 
where T is the total time to break the frame encryption, A is 
the average number of attempts to locate frame containing the 
user data in the frame transmission group, ET is the time to 
break the security layer frame encryption dependent on 
factors such as cipher, cipher mode, key size, and currently 
available cryptanalysis attack techniques, N is the number of 
frames in the transmission group, and i is the frame position 
within the group. 
   The FTG security therefore on average provides N/2 times 
greater security than the padding security mode. In order for 
the FTG mode to provide more effective security than the 
padding security mode, the transmission group size must be 
larger than 2. Therefore FTG at least requires a bandwidth 
three times greater than what would be required if security 
was not used or if the padding security mode was used. 
   The FTG security mode also favors smaller transmission 
group sizes, which limits the required additional bandwidth 
for this security mode. Since (4) indicates that the average 
amount of time to break the security is half of the 
transmission group size, large transmission groups do not 
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provide as much security for the data transmissions in 
comparison to the amount of time it would take to 
manufacture and transmit the frames. 
   For the FTG security mode to be effective, each of the 
frames in the transmission group must be using different 
encryption, as was proposed for the security layer. If the same 
encryption was used for each of the transmission group 
frames, the security would be equivalent to (3), which is no 
security improvement compared to the padding security mode. 
The FTG security mode is also still vulnerable to the traffic 
analysis attack where the total number of frames transmitted 
within a period of time is counted to determine the type of 
data being transmitted, i.e. control or monitoring data. 
C.  Split Frame Transmission Group 
   The SFTG security mode increases the overall processing 
for the security layer in comparison to the FTG mode with the 
security layer generating N frames, where N is the size of the 
frame transmission group. In addition, the destination requires 
more processing capability for the SFTG modes since it must 
reassemble the user data-link layer frame from the 
manufactured frames. The SFTG security mode therefore 
requires a bandwidth increase by a factor of N to provide the 
same performance as a device that did not use the security 
layer due to the additional manufactured frames. The 
bandwidth may not be an issue for LANs or for networks 
using fiber-optics as the transmission medium since the DNP3 
frames are much smaller than the available bandwidth. 
   The strength of the SFTG security mode is given by (5) in 
comparison to the padding mode. 
( )ETNT 1+=              (5) 
where T is the total time to break the frame encryption, N is 
the number of frames in the transmission group, and ET is the 
time to break the security layer frame encryption dependent 
on factors such as cipher, cipher mode, key size, and currently 
available cryptanalysis attack techniques. 
   The SFTG security therefore provides (N+1) times greater 
security than the padding security mode. The SFTG mode 
provides stronger security with its minimum transmission 
group size (N=2) than the FTG mode does with its minimum 
transmission group size (N=3). The SFTG security mode 
requires a bandwidth at least two times greater than what 
would be required if security was not used or if the padding 
mode was used. Since the SFTG security mode provides as 
much security as the size of the transmission group, larger 
transmission groups provide greater security. The limiting 
factor for the SFTG security mode is the bandwidth 
limitations, the delays associated in reassembling the user data 
from all the manufactured frames, and the increased 
processing requirements. 
   For the SFTG security mode to be effective, as was the case 
for the FTG security mode, each of the frames in the 
transmission group must be using different encryption, as was 
proposed for the security layer. The SFTG security mode is 
also still vulnerable to the traffic analysis attack where the 
total number of frames transmitted within a period of time is 
counted to determine the type of data being transmitted, i.e. 
control or monitoring data. 
   The SFTG security mode is slightly less vulnerable to replay 
attacks than the other security modes since the frames in the 
transmission group are not independent of each other. If an 
attacker inserts a frame into the sequence, the reassembled 
frame by the security layer is unlikely to have valid DNP3 
data-link layer CRC values, and will therefore be discarded by 
the data-link layer. Valid CRC values are very unlikely since 
the user data segments are random in size and will therefore 
not match the user block(s) CRC values. 
D.  Performance 
The three security-mode operations were tested using non-
optimized code complied for Windows 2000 on a Pentium 
550 MHz machine using a commercial visual-based compiler 
and commercial software encryption components. Therefore 
higher performance would be expected for an optimized real-
system device. 
   In Fig. 5, the padding security mode operations are shown 
with various sized data-link frames, from the minimum 10 
octets to the maximum 292 octets. The data transmission size 
axis is marked for the user data sizes from the transport layer, 
and therefore range from 0 octets (frame size = 10 octets) to 
250 octets (frame size = 292 octets). The encryption used 
with the padding mode was the 256-bit Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) using the chain blocking cipher (CBC) mode 
with no authentication. 
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Fig. 5.  Padding mode operation performance for various user data sizes. 
 As can been seen from Fig. 5, the padding operations 
(rounded to the nearest tenth of a millisecond) have negligible 
effects on the encryption operations. Therefore, only the FTG 
and SFTG security modes require consideration performance 
wise for the DNP3. The same test was performed for the 
padding mode decryption operations, with negligible 
differences between encryption and decryption operations. 
  In Fig. 6, the FTG and SFTG security mode encryption 
operations are shown compared to each other for various 
transmission group sizes. The minimum FTG transmission 
group size was N=3 while the SFTG minimum transmission 
group size was N=2. Transmission group sizes was limited to 
ten since large transmission group sizes are not practical for 
DNP3 devices, due to the overhead in manufacturing frames 
and the delays associated with the destination receiving the 
data, especially with the SFTG mode where the data is divided 
across all of the frames in the transmission group. The same 
encryption was used for the FTG and SFTG modes as the 
padding mode.  
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Fig. 6. FTG and SFTG modes encryption operation performance for various 
frame group sizes. FTG is the solid line and SFTG is the dashed line. 
   Fig. 7 shows the FTG and SFTG security mode decryption 
operations compared to each other for the same transmission 
group sizes as given in Fig.5. Fig. 7 shows that the decryption 
operations are quicker than the encryption operations since 
there is less data manipulation. The FTG decryption 
performance was better than the SFTG decryption 
performance since there was less data manipulation. 
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Fig. 7. FTG and SFTG modes decryption operation performance for various 
frame group sizes. FTG is the solid line and SFTG is the dashed line. 
Table I provides the numeric results for the FTG and SFTG 
mode for a more detailed comparison of values, with a 
transmission group size of (N=3) which is the minimum group 
size for the FTG mode. 
Table I 
FTG and SFTG Performance for (N=3) 
 
Security Mode Encryption Decryption 
FTG 1.3 ms 0.7 ms 
SFTG 1.6 ms 0.8 ms 
   Based on the results from Table I, and the padding mode 
operation performance, Table II indicates the overall 
performance for each of the security modes based on a single 
user data-link layer frame. In Table II, the bandwidth 
transmission time (TT) is given in relationship to the padding 
mode since the other security modes are multiples of this 
value.  
Table II 
Overall Mode Performance for a Link with (N=3) 
Security Mode Overall Performance 
Padding 0.3 ms + TT 
FTG 1.6 ms + TT ≤ FTG ≤ 2.0 ms + 3TT 
SFTG 2.4 ms + 3TT 
 
   In Table II, the FTG has a range of values for the overall 
performance, since the user data-link frame will be between 
the first and last frames in the transmission group. If the user 
data-link layer frame is the first frame, the decryption 
operations are equivalent to the padding decryption operation. 
IV.  SECURITY OPERATION FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
STABILITY CONTROL APPLICATION 
   The proposed security operations have been successfully 
applied for enhancement of laboratory prototype power 
distribution system stability control. 
Stability concerns increase rapidly with today’s growing 
demands for open access to power systems for electricity 
generation and trading, facilitated by new government 
deregulations. As proposed by the authors previously [11], a 
novel generator control based on step-ahead predictive control 
methodology and state-of-the-art real-time digital signal 
processing technology has been proposed to significantly 
improve the stability and operational coordination of 
distribution systems particularly those with dispersed 
generations, open access operations, or weakly connections to 
bulk power systems. However, due to limited computational 
capabilities of general-purpose microprocessors, the 
predictive control method was originally proposed only for 
the Single Machine Infinite Bus (SMIB) system. In general, it 
is fairly difficult to control the disturbances and its 
consequently potential stability problems in the power 
distribution system due to its constantly varying loads. The 
control method designed for the SMIB system often 
experiences difficulties for application in power distribution 
systems. 
With the utilization of the security operations proposed in 
this paper, the novel generator stability control that was 
previously proposed by the authors [4] can be applied to 
enhance the stability of power distribution systems. For this 
stability control application, a real-time equivalent circuit of 
the power distribution system has to be created for use in the 
predictive control. For example, in order to use the predictive 
control method to control the generator GEN-1 shown in Fig.6 
that is simplified from the benchmark distribution system 
given in IEEE Std. 399-1997 for distribution system studies 
[12], an equivalent-circuit for the power distribution system at 
the point of connection for the generator GEN-1, as shown in 
Fig.8, has to be obtained through the calculation of the 
equivalent impedance and equivalent voltage. 
   In general, it would be difficult to obtain an accurate 
equivalent circuit for a power distribution system because its 
loads often switch on or off. With data collecting devices 
installed at the buses to monitor the disturbances caused by 
load changes or faults in the power distribution system, the 
operation data on each bus in the distribution system can be 
transmitted to the controller of the generator to update the 
equivalent circuit impedance and voltage. The security 
operations proposed in this paper can be used to ensure the 
integrity of data transmissions for creation of an equivalent 
circuit for use in the stability control of distribution systems. 
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Fig.8  Simplified one-line diagram for IEEE power system 
Generator Equivalent Circuit of Power Distribution System
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Fig.9  Equivalent circuit for the power distribution system shown in Fig. 8 
V.  CONCLUSION 
   Three security operation modes of the security layer located 
below the DNP3 data-link layer, which are padding security 
mode, the FTG security mode, and the SFTG security mode, 
have been proposed to enhance the security of power system 
computer networks in this paper. 
  The padding mode provides improved security beyond 
simply only using encryption with negligible effects on 
performance. The padding mode is therefore suited for lower 
security demands. The FTG security mode provides much 
higher security than the padding mode, but with increased 
processing overhead. The SFTG security mode provided 
much higher security than the FTG mode, but with higher 
processing demand. The FTG and SFTG modes are 
recommended for links requiring high security or for links that 
temporarily require higher security during cyber-attacks. The 
transition between modes is highly flexible, allowing links 
that require temporary higher levels of security to easily 
transition to a higher security mode and then back to the 
normal mode afterwards. The transitions between modes can 
occur immediately without prior information exchanges and 
independently, such as one mode for each link or an 
outstation transitioning modes without request from a master. 
  The results from the performance analysis for the three 
security modes show that these three security operation 
modes can provide additional strength to encryption and 
authentication operations in limiting the effectiveness and 
applicability of traffic analysis and cryptanalysis attacks for 
power system data transmissions. Since the security layer 
modes are independent of specific encryption ciphers and 
authentication operations, the paper does not provide 
constraints on the types of encryption ciphers or 
authentications used for the data transmissions.  
The security operations proposed in this paper have been 
successfully applied to enhance power system security 
controls. 
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